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Abstract
The increase in carbondioxide emissions by some countries in reaction to an
emission reduction by countries with climate policy (carbon leakage) is seen
as a serious threat to unilateral climate policy. Using a two-country model
where only one of the countries enforces an exogenous cap on emissions,
this paper analyzes the effect of technical change that can be directed to-
wards the clean or dirty input, on carbon leakage. We show that, as long
as technical change cannot be directed, there will always be carbon leakage
through the standard terms-of-trade effect. However, once we allow for di-
rected technical change, a counterbalancing induced technology effect arises
and carbon leakage will generally be lower. Moreover, we show that when
the relative demand for energy is sufﬁciently elastic, carbon leakage may be
negative: the technology effect induces the unconstrained region to volun-
tarily reduce its own emissions.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F18, O33, Q54, Q55.
Keywords: Climate Policy, Carbon Leakage, Directed Technical Change, Interna-
tional Trade.
1 Introduction
An important threat to climate policy is that actions undertaken without univer-
sal participation may prove ineffective: any partial agreement to reduce emis-
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sions (of carbondioxide, for example1) will be undermined by the behaviour of
countries outside the agreement. Standard economic theory suggests that these
countries may indeed have several incentives to increase their polluting emis-
sions. In the ﬁrst place, the relative price for carbon-intensive goods could in-
crease giving countries outside the coalition incentives to expand their produc-
tion of these goods and export them to signatory countries (terms-of-trade ef-
fect). Secondly, a lower fossil fuel price due to the reduced demand from the
constrained economies could induce substitution towards fossil fuels in coun-
tries without a carbon constraint. Third, if damage costs from the global pollu-
tant are strictly convex in the total emission level, marginal environmental costs
can decrease in unconstrained countries and emissions levels may be revised up-
wards. For all these reasons, emissions in unconstrained countries can increase
and off-set the reductions secured by the agreement participants, a phenomenon
known as carbon leakage.
That carbon leakage will arise as a consequence of a partial climate change
policy effort is widely accepted by economists. Yet so far the role of technical
change has been grossly underestimated in this debate. This paper ﬁlls this gap.
We demonstrate that allowing for endogenous differences in rates of technical
change across sectors reduces the degree of carbon leakage and can be conducive
to a reversal of the conclusions sketched above. In particular, we show that en-
dogenous technical change per se is not enough to reverse the pattern of carbon
leakage. Only when the direction (not just the level) of innovation responds to
proﬁt incentives can such a reversal occur.
We present a two country framework in which innovations occur endoge-
nously as a result of research investment. We compare the effects of an exoge-
nously imposed emission constraint in one of the countries on the choice of pol-
lution in the other for two different regimes of technical change. The ﬁrst regime
reﬂects the ‘traditional’ way of modelling technical change as increasing total
factor productivity. We show that in this case carbon leakage will occur through
the terms-of-trade effect described above. In the second regime, new inventions
can be aimed at the industry that gives the highest proﬁts, and technical change
may beneﬁt one of the productive factors more than the other. Climate policy
will change the relative prices of inputs and hence the relative proﬁtability of in-
venting for the clean or dirty industry.2 In this case carbon leakage is generally
reduced and can even become negative.
Our aim in this paper is to isolate the effects of the regime of technical change
1Carbondioxide (CO2) is the greenhouse gas with the highest global warming contribution
since it is both emitted in large amounts and has a low decay rate. Therefore most of the eco-
nomics literature on climate policy focuses on CO2. For simplicity we call the global pollutant in
this paper carbon or carbondioxide as well, yet our analysis applies to any other greenhouse gas
associated with energy production or fossil fuel extraction, like methane.
2Popp (2002) and Newell et al. (1999), among others, show that energy prices (including the
effect of environmental policy) positively affect environmentally friendly innovations.Carbon leakage revisited 3
on carbon leakage. To do this we assume that our two countries are perfectly
symmetric as refers to preferences, technology and endowments. We only allow
them to differ in one crucial respect: one of them imposes an exogenously given
binding emission cap, while the other remains unconstrained. In this way we ob-
tain the necessary degree of asymmetry in environmental policy without having
to postulate differences in fundamentals that would cloud our analysis. Using
this setup we decompose the effects of unilateral policy in a standard terms-of-
trade effect and an additional induced technology effect and address their relative
sizes.
The problem of carbon leakage has been widely studied using Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) models to assess the consequences of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. These models generally report leakage rates ranging from 5% to 20% (see
e.g. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2000)), although some papers ﬁnd leakage
rates as high as 60% (Light et al. (2000)). Babiker (2005) even ﬁnds a leakage
rate of 130% for one of his scenarios: in this case the Kyoto Protocol would lead
to an increase in global carbondioxide emissions. These differences in estimates
arise because of different assumptions in the degree of international market in-
tegration, substitution and supply elasticities, and market structure. Although
CGE models allow for both international and sectoral disaggregations, they do
not take into account the effect of climate policy on technical change.
Another rich strand of literature has addressed asymmetric climate policy
from a public economics point of view (see e.g. Barrett (1994), Carraro and Sinis-
calco (1998), and Hoel (1991)). Stressing the roles of free-riding incentives and
strategic behaviour among nations, but abstracting from both technical change
and international trade, this literature concludes that emissions among countries
are strategic substitutes and that unilateral climate policy will lead to emissions
leakage.
Two recent papers show that a reversal in the direction of carbon leakage is
possible in models with either technical change or international trade. Golombek
and Hoel (2004) present a static partial equilibrium two-country one good model
with transboundary pollution. In each country a central planner chooses R&D
expenditures and abatement levels to minimize total costs that include environ-
mental damages. Since positive international technology spillovers are assumed
to reduce abatement costs, the authors effectively build in their model a mech-
anism that counteracts the free-riding incentives shown by previous literature.
Under appropriate conditions this mechanism is sufﬁcient to generate negative
leakage(anincreaseinabatement)intheforeigncountry, followinganincreasein
abatement at home. Although the end result is the same, our contribution differs
from theirs in many respects. In the ﬁrst place there are no free-riding incentives
in our framework. The incentives to expand emissions arise purely from changes
in the terms-of-trade. Moreover, and more poignantly, we do not assume a priori
that technical change always leads to cleaner technology. In our model the na-Carbon leakage revisited 4
ture of technical change is itself driven by proﬁt incentives and depends on the
characteristics of production.
Copeland and Taylor (2005) show, among other things, that in the presence of
international trade, a country’s response to a rest-of-world emissions reduction
is ambiguous. In their static two-good, two-factor, K-country model (modiﬁed to
take into account polluting emissions) without technical change, this result fol-
lows from allowing for income and substitution effects on the consumption side
to offset the terms-of-trade effect on the production side. Hence the mechanism
underlying their result is different from ours, both in terms of modelling and of
economic content.
The paper develops as follows. We introduce the model in section 2 and
present the general equilibrium conditions for both the model with and without
unilateral climate policy, with and without directed technical change, in section
3. Section 4 ﬁrst studies carbon leakage when entrepreneurs cannot aim new
technologies to one of the sectors and introduces the terms-of-trade effect. We
then focus on carbon leakage under directed technical change and show how
the induced technology effect changes the results found before. We conclude in
section 5.
2 The Model
Our economy consists of two countries, c and u, that have identical production
technologies and endowments, and only differ in their environmental policies.
We assume that country c (for constrained) imposes a binding cap on polluting
emissions.3 We focus on a situation of free trade noting that, as long as the two
countries do not differ in environmental policies, there will be no actual scope
for trade.
In each country, ﬁnal output Y is obtained as a CES aggregate of two (inter-













where r = c,u is the country index. We assume that good YE is produced using
energy and a specialized set of differentiated machines, of which a set of mass
NE is available. Instead YL is produced using labour (LL) and a different set
of machines, whose mass is indicated by NL. Following Acemoglu (2002), the
3In this paper we focus on production decisions for given environmental policy. Since we
do not discuss growth rates or welfare and assume balanced trade, (intertemporal) preferences
play no role. Hence the consumption side of the model is redundant and we only present the
production side.Carbon leakage revisited 5

























where b 2 (0,1) and kr
j (i) is the amount of machines of type i employed in sector
j = L,E in country r. Both intermediate goods are traded internationally.
To produce each type of machines, producers need a blueprint invented by
the R&D sector, as discussed below. We assume that machines developed to
complement one factor of production cannot be usefully employed in the other
sector and that blueprints can be traded internationally. Accordingly, NE and
NL represent global levels of technology and producers in each country can use
all machine types globally available for their sector. For a given state of tech-
nology, that is for given NE and NL, both (2) and (3) exhibit constant returns to
scale. However, when NE and NL grow due to R&D activities the returns will be
increasing at the aggregate level.4
We assume that in each country an amount of labour equal to L is inelastically
supplied at each point in time and that it is immobile across countries. Labour
can either be employed in the production of the labour intensive good YL or in





E is the amount of labour in energy production in country r. As in
Babiker(2005), weassume thatenergyhasto be producedusing labourand some





where f 2 (0,1).
Energy generation causes emissions of carbondioxide. We assume that CO2
emissions, Z, are proportional to the amount of energy produced, so that
Z = E. (6)
When country c introduces a binding constraint on the amount of carbondioxide
emitted, it de facto imposes a cap on the amount of labour allocated to energy
production. Indeed, when Zc is the maximum amount of emissions permitted at
anypointintime, theallocationoflabourincountry c mustsatisfy: Lc
E = (Zc)
1/f.
4In other words, our model exhibits endogenous growth through variety expansion in the
machines sector. See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991).Carbon leakage revisited 6
The last part of our model consists of the process of technical change. We
consider two alternative possibilities in this paper: technical change can either
be ‘undirected’ or ‘directed’. With undirected or ’traditional’ technical change,
prospective innovators invest in the development of blueprints whenever it is
proﬁtable to do so, yet they cannot choose the sector they want to develop a new
machinefor. Instead, weassumethatwithprobability g 2 (0,1) thenewlydevel-
opedblueprintwillbeenergy-complementingandwithprobability(1¡g) itwill
be labour-complementing. As a consequence the (expected) relative marginal
productivity is constant, as is common in traditional (one-sector) models of en-
dogenous growth. The relative size of the set of machines available in the two
sectors, NE/NL = g/(1¡ g), can be pinned down by an opportune choice of the
probability g. Using a lab-equipment speciﬁcation for the process of technical
change, we assume that investing one unit of the ﬁnal good in R&D generates n
new innovations.5 The total number of innovations in this case will therefore be
given by:
˙ N = n(Rc + Ru), (7)
where Rr indicates total R&D investment by country r, and a dot on a variable
represents its time derivative, i.e. ˙ x = dx/dt.
The second type of technical change regime that we consider is directed tech-
nical change.6 In this case prospective innovators, besides deciding the amount
of their R&D outlays, are able to choose the sector they want to target their in-
novation efforts to. Hence they will invent new machines for the sector that
promises the highest returns. The development of new types of machines takes
place according to the following production functions:7
˙ NE = n(Rc
E + Ru
E), (8)
˙ NL = n(Rc
L + Ru
L). (9)
A new blueprint must be developed before the innovator can sell it to pro-
ducers, thus the costs of R&D are sunk. As a consequence, machine producers
must wield some monopoly power in the market for machines, in order to re-
coup the costs of obtaining the license on the blueprint. For this, we assume that
an innovator will obtain a global patent for her invention and that patents are
perfectly enforced in both countries. As a result, each innovation will take place
only once and there is no international overlap in blueprints.
Furthermore, we simplify the analysis by assuming that machine production
is local, that is innovators license their blueprints to one producer in each region,
so that blueprints are traded across countries, but machines are not.
5See Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
6The seminal work in this ﬁeld is due to Daron Acemoglu. See, for example, Acemoglu (2002).
7For simplicity we assume that R&D is equally productive in the two sectors. Relaxing this
assumption introduces a constant in the expressions that follow but does not alter our qualitative
results.Carbon leakage revisited 7
3 The Equilibrium
In this section we derive the general equilibrium allocation of labour. We ﬁrst
derive a necessary condition for equilibrium on the goods and factor markets.
For the model with undirected technical change, this condition gives the general
equilibrium amount of labour in energy production. For the model with directed
technical change, instead, we need to take another step and study the equilib-
rium in the market for innovations. Joint consideration of these two conditions
will give the general equilibrium allocation under directed technical change.
3.1 Equilibrium on the goods and factor markets
We start by assuming that technology levels NE and NL are given, and focus on
the goods market. The market for the ﬁnal good is perfectly competitive and
we choose the ﬁnal good’s price as the numeraire. It follows that a necessary
condition for the optimal demand for labour- and energy-intensive goods is that












where pj is the price of good Yj , j = E, L. Notice that we introduced a superscript
d to indicate demand and avoid confusion with supply in (2) and (3). Prices will
be equalized across the two regions since countries are either symmetric or they
trade at no cost, so throughout the paper prices indicate international ones.
Producers of the intermediate good Yj maximize proﬁts taking prices and
technology as given. In particular, they choose the amount of inputs taking as
given the prices of their output (pj), of the primary input they use (wj) and of the
machines they use (pkj(i) for a machine of type i complementing factor j), and the
range of available machines Nj.8
Using (2) and (3) we can derive the local demand for a machine of type i in

















8Throughout the paper we will refer to energy (E) and labour used in the production of YL
(LL) as primary inputs, although in the model labour is the only ”truly” primary input.Carbon leakage revisited 8
























As mentioned before, the holder of a patent licenses production to one pro-
ducer in each region. Consequently, local producers act as monopolists on their
local market. We assume that the production of machines in both sectors entails
a constant marginal cost, equal to w units of the ﬁnal good. Each monopolist
maximizes her proﬁts subject to the appropriate demand function in (11). As a
result, each monopolistic producer will set her price as a constant mark-up over
marginal cost, that is pkj(i) = w/(1 ¡ b). Letting w = 1 ¡ b for convenience, we
can set the price of machines in both sectors equal to 1.9
Using this result we obtain an expression for the relative supply of goods
that depends on relative prices, relative (primary) factors supplies and relative
technology,
Yw = p(1¡b)/bSwN. (14)
In the remainder of the paper we deﬁne variables without a subscript as ratios,
with the convention that the variables at the numerator refer to the energy sector
E. Hence, we refer to N ´ NE/NL as the (global) technology ratio and we deﬁne
the global relative factor supply as Sw ´ (Ec + Eu)/(Lc
L + Lu
L). Superscript w
indicates that the variable concerned represents a global (world) amount or ratio.
Equalling relative supply (14) and relative demand (10) yields the market
clearing relative price for intermediate goods, for given technology:
p = (NSw)
¡b/s , (15)
where we deﬁne s ´ 1 + (# ¡ 1)b. From (15) we see that a higher level of tech-
nology in the dirty goods sector, or a higher relative supply of energy decreases
the relative price of the dirty good.
We now turn to the market for factors. Substituting machine demands (11)
into the inverse demand functions for energy (12) and labour (13), we obtain an
expression for the relative factor rewards. Using this and the market clearing
relative price for intermediate goods (15), we get the following expression for
the relative factor rewards for given technology:
w = N(s¡1)/s (Sw)
¡1/s . (16)
9Notice that machines are equally productive in intermediate goods’ production and all entail
the same cost. Thus, the amount of each machine used in sectorial production will be the same,
kj say. This symmetry simpliﬁes the structure of the sectorial production functions, in fact we
may write:
R Nj
0 kj(i)(1¡b)di = Njk
(1¡b)
j , for j = E, L.Carbon leakage revisited 9
The relative price of energy decreases with energy supply, while the effect of the
technology ratio N depends on whether s is larger or smaller than unity. Solving
equation (16) for Sw gives Sw = Ns¡1w¡s, which informs us that s is the the
elasticity of relative factor demand with respect to their relative price. Hence,
the effect of the technology ratio on relative factor rewards depends on whether
relative energy demand is elastic or inelastic.10
To fully characterize the equilibrium on the goods and factor markets for
given technology, we need to determine the way in which labour is allocated
between production of the labour intensive intermediate good and energy pro-
duction. As noted in section 2, when country c faces a binding emission con-
straint, the amount of labour in energy production is exogenously determined
by the cap, Lc
E = (Zc)1/f. In an unconstrained country however, each energy
producer chooses the amount of labour so as to maximize her proﬁts, subject to
the production function in (5) and taking prices as given. An energy producer
can employ labour (at a unit cost of wL) to produce and sell her output at the pre-
vailing market price wE. This simple maximization problem yields the following
ﬁrst-order condition, which expresses an unconstrained country’s demand for








Equalizing this expression and (16) we ﬁnd an expression representing the equi-
librium allocation of labour by country u, for a given technology ratio N and for













E = 2L. (17)
In this expression we allow for the possibility that each country chooses a differ-
ent level of labour in energy production. It is clear that, as long as no binding
emission cap is introduced, a symmetric expression holds for country c. In this
case, given that countries are identical, they will choose the same equilibrium
amount of labour in energy production, so that we can rewrite the above expres-
sion, letting Lu
E = Lc
E = LE, as
f¡sN1¡sL
f(1¡s)+s
E + LE = L. (18)
Here LE is the amount of labour employed in energy production in each country,
when both countries are unconstrained.
In sum, when country c faces a binding emission constraint, its emissions,
energy generation and amount of labour in energy producion are determined
10From the deﬁnition of s as 1 + (# ¡ 1)b, it is clear that s ? 1 , # ? 1. Thus relative factor
demand is elastic if and only if intermediate goods are gross substitutes in the production of the
ﬁnal good, and inelastic if and only if they are gross complements.Carbon leakage revisited 10
by the cap. In this case Lc
E = (Zc)
1/f. Yet expression (17) still holds for the
unconstrained country, u, and it solves (implicitly) for the amount of labour in
energy production in the unconstrained region for given N.
As discussed in section 2, when technical change is undirected the technology
ratio N is constant. Consequently, in this case equations (17) and (18) determine
the general equilibrium allocation of labour. Under directed technical change,
however, N is endogenous and entrepreneurs have to decide for which sector
to invent new machines. For this speciﬁcation of technical change we need to
study the equilibrium on the market for innovations to determine the general
equilibrium allocation of labour.
3.2 Equilibrium on the market for innovations
Under directed technical change innovators choose both the amount and the di-
rection of their innovation efforts. Quite naturally they will invest in the sector
which is expected to yield the highest rate of return. Using (11), the instanta-
neous proﬁts are given by the following expressions:
pE = bp
1/b




At each point in time, then, the direction of innovation will be determined by rel-
ative proﬁts: p = p1/bSw. This expression clearly shows that the entrepreneurs’
choice of the sector to invest in is determined by the relative price of the inter-
mediate goods (the price effect) and by the relative amount of factors to which a
machine type is complementary (the market-size effect). In particular, for given
technology, a decrease in energy supply leads to a reduction in relative proﬁts
through the market size effect and to an increase through the price effect, see
(15). Which of the two effects prevails depends on the elasticity s, as will be
discussed later.
Each potential innovator maximizes the net present value of the stream of
future proﬁts that she expects to enjoy over time. Expressing this in standard
dynamic programming equations gives r(t)Vj(t) ¡ ˙ Vj(t) = pj(t), where Vj is the
value of an innovation in sector j = E, L. This expression relates the present
discounted value of developing an innovation, Vj, to instantaneous proﬁts and it
allows for the ﬂow of proﬁts to change over time through the ”capital gain” term
˙ Vj. Along the balanced growth path of the economy, proﬁts will not change over
time so ˙ Vj must be zero.11 Since entry is free in the R&D sector, we know that the
value of an innovation cannot exceed its cost (see (8) and (9)) so that Vj · 1/n in
each sector. Moreover, along the balanced growth path both types of innovation
must occur at the same time, so that Vj = 1/n in both sectors. From this we can
11We deﬁne a balanced growth path as a situation in which prices are constant and NE and NL
grow at the same constant rate.Carbon leakage revisited 11
derive the following no-arbitrage equation for the research sector:
pEn = pLn,
which, after substituting for proﬁts from (19), can be rearranged to read
p1/bSw = 1. (20)
This no-arbitrage equation enables us to solve for the equilibrium level of the
technology ratio N. Indeed, using the expression for relative prices in (15), we
may solve (20) for N, obtaining the following expression for the balanced growth
path equilibrium ratio of technology levels in the two sectors:
N = (Sw)s¡1. (21)
From this expression we see that, as noted above, the effect of a decrease in en-
ergy supply on the direction of technical change, that is on whether N increases
or decreases, depends on the size of s. When labour- and energy-intensive goods
are gross complements in ﬁnal goods production (s < 1), the price effect in (19)
outweighs the market size effect and a decrease in energy supply induces an in-
crease in the range of energy complementary machines. However, when s > 1
the result is reversed and the reduction in energy supply induces an increase in
the range of labour-complementary machines.
3.3 Generalequilibriumallocationunderdirectedtechnicalchange
In the previous sections we have derived equilibrium conditions for the goods
and factor markets and for the market for innovations. We are now ready to
derive the general equilibrium allocation of labour for the model with directed
technical change, as it obtains when both markets are in equilibrium at the same
time.12
Substituting (21) into (17) yields the general expression for the equilibrium













E = 2L. (22)
Interpreting Lc
E as the constrained level of labour used in energy generation in
country c following the introduction of an emissions cap, this expression solves
for Lu
E in the unconstrained country under directed technical change.
12It is possible to show that the model has an interior stable equilibrium for s 2 (0,(1+f)/f).
The stability of the equilibrium requires that in the (LE, N) plane the line depicting the goods
market equilibrium (17) is steeper than the no-arbitrage equation (21), at the point of intersection.
The details of the existence and stability discussion are available from the authors upon request.Carbon leakage revisited 12
Alternatively, assuming that no environmental policy is in place, we can in-
terpret (22) as one of the two (symmetric) expressions that determine the equi-
librium level of Lc
E = Lu
E = LE under directed technical change. Substituting LE
for the country speciﬁc variables yields the following expression:
f1/(s¡2)L
(f(s¡1)¡1)/(s¡2)
E + LE = L. (23)
The above equations summarize the long-run equilibrium of our model with
and without unilateral climate policy, under directed technical change. Indeed,
they solve implicitly for the optimal level of Lu
E (LE, respectively), from which we
can immediately derive all the other variables of the model.
4 Unilateral climate policy and carbon leakage
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of unilateral climate policy, in terms
of carbon leakage, across different regimes of technical change. To be able to
compare different scenarios, we need to start from a common baseline. The nat-
ural baseline to choose is the long-run equilibrium of the model with directed
technical change when both countries are unconstrained (22). This baseline is
characterized by the (symmetric) equilibrium level of labour devoted to energy
generation LE and by the corresponding technology ratio N. In order to have
comparable baselines across technology regimes, we choose g, the probability
for an innovator to end up with an E-complementing blueprint in the undirected
technical change version of the model, such that g/(1 ¡ g) = N. Starting from
this common equilibrium, we introduce an emissions constraint in one of the
countries and study the degree of carbon leakage that occurs along the balanced
growth path.
We ﬁrst study carbon leakage when technical change is undirected. Then we
move on to the model with directed technical change and discuss how and why
the results from this model differ from the model with ’traditional’ endogenous
growth.
4.1 Carbon Leakage under undirected technical change
Carbon leakage occurs when the unconstrained region increases its emissions in
reaction to a reduction in emissions by the other country. In terms of our model,
there is carbon leakage whenever Lu
E > LE. Intuitively it would seem clear that
there should always be some carbon leakage: when a country exogenously re-
duces its supply of energy by introducing a limit to the amount of emissions,
the energy intensive good becomes scarcer on its domestic market, giving rise
to an increase in its relative price. This creates the scope for trade: the uncon-
strained economy now enjoys a comparative advantage in the production of theCarbon leakage revisited 13
dirty good and will expand its production thereof. As a consequence Lu
E and
hence emissions Zu increase. We call this the terms-of-trade effect of a unilateral
emission constraint. This result indeed holds in the case of undirected technical
change, as formalized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When technical change is undirected, carbon leakage will always be
positive along the balanced growth path.


























E · LE. Then the right hand side is larger than or equal to one
while the left hand side is smaller than one. So we have a contradiction, hence
Lu
E > LE.
We illustrate this result in Figure 1, where the dark dashed line represents
emissions (or equivalently energy production) in each country when both are
unconstrained. The amount of emissions by the unconstrained country when
the other country faces a binding emission constraint, under undirected techni-
cal change is represented by the solid black line.13 The ﬁgure clearly shows that
emissions in the unconstrained region always increase following the introduc-
tion of the cap. In addition, we see that the amount of energy produced in the
unconstrained region is declining with s, the elasticity of relative demand for
energy with respect to its relative price. The higher this elasticity, the lower the
demand for energy in the constrained economy following the imposition of the
constraint, hence the lower the export-led increase in energy generation.
When technical change is endogenous but undirected, unilateral climate pol-
icy is undermined by emission increases by unconstrained countries. The ques-
tion now arises whether unilateral climate policy can even induce an increase in
global emissions, as for example in Babiker (2005). To address this question, we
use a log-linearized version of our model, which we derive in Appendix A, to
obtain the following result:
Proposition 2. When technical change is undirected, global emissions will always de-
crease following a marginal tightening of the emission constraint.
13The ﬁgures in this paper are obtained from numerical simulations, using as baseline param-
eters values: L = 1, f = 0.4, and s 2 (0, 3.5). Furthermore for each value of s the appropriate
value for N for the model without directed technical change is computed such that both models
start from the same baseline. We performed numerous robustness checks without qualitative
changes in the results. For the sake of graphical clarity the graphs are plotted over a smaller
range for s.Carbon leakage revisited 14
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Figure 1: Emissions in the unconstrained model (Z), in the constrained model under
undirected technical change (ZuUTC), and under directed technical change (ZuDTC)
Proof. In section A.2 of the Appendix, we show that we can write a change in
global energy production (emissions) f Ew as:
f Ew =






(1¡ f)s + hf + n
f Lc
E. (24)
The denominator and the ﬁrst term in the numerator are positive. Moreover,
from Proposition 1 and the deﬁnition of a binding cap we have Lu
E > LE > Lc
E. It
follows that also the second term at the numerator is positive. Hence f Ew/f Lc
E >
0.
Although this proposition refers to the linearized version of the model, our
numerical simulations suggest that the results also hold for the non-linearized
model, as illustrated in Figure 2. Here we present the leakage rate, deﬁned as
the ratio between the induced increase in emissions in the unconstrained coun-
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function of s. The leakage rate for the case of undirected technical change is
represented by the dark line. As the ﬁgure shows, the leakage rate is always
positive, but less than 1.
 





UTC  DTC 
Figure 2: Leakage rate under undirected and directed technical change
4.2 Carbon leakage under directed technical change
In this section we focus on the central point of our analysis and compare the
effects of an emission cap across regimes of technical change. We start by not-
ing that allowing for directed technical change effectively provides the economy
with an additional instrument to cope with the consequences of the introduction
of a binding cap in the constrained country. Changes in the composition of tech-
nology may enable the unconstrained country to meet the increased demand for
energy intensive goods while diverting less labour from its relatively more pro-
ductive use in the YL sector. Thus we may expect that this additional degree of
freedom will lead to a reduction in emissions by the unconstrained country, and
hence in the degree of carbon leakage, compared to the case of undirected techni-
cal change. Indeed, we will show that the relative productivity of energy adjusts
in such a way that, compared to the case where technical change is undirected,
less energy is demanded. This is what we call the induced technology effect of a
unilateral emission constraint. We will show that this effect has the opposite signCarbon leakage revisited 16
to the terms-of-trade effect introduced above and hence tends to reduce carbon
leakage.
Comparing the two versions of the model boils down to an exercise in com-
parative statics for a maximization problem (proﬁt maximization by energy gen-
erators), when one binding constraint is removed (N is free to adjust in the di-
rected technical change case). A natural way to address this problem is through
the Le Chatelier principle. Taking the total differential of (17) and rearranging





























where DTC indicates directed technical change and UTC undirected technical
change. We can interpret this expression as saying that the overall effect of the
cap when allowing for directed technical change (the left hand side) can be de-
composed in a terms-of-trade effect, represented by the ﬁrst term at the right-hand
side, and a induced technology effect, the remaining term. Whether these two ef-
fects act in the same direction or not ultimately determines under which regime
we can expect leakage to be higher. In order to draw any conclusion, we need to
sign the components of the above equation.
We know from Proposition 1 that the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is al-
ways negative. For the second term, let us consider ﬁrst the case where s < 1.
From (21) we see that dN/dLc
E < 0. On the other hand, from (17) it is clear that
when N (and hence N1¡s) increases, Lu
E must decline to satisfy the equation, ce-
teris paribus, thus ¶Lu
E/¶N < 0. This shows that the last term at the right-hand
side of (25) is positive for s < 1. A symmetric argument holds when the rela-
tive energy demand is elastic, i.e. when s > 1. In this case both derivatives are
positive, and their product is still positive.
To complete our discussion, notice that when s equals unity N is indepen-
dent of Sw and always equal to 1, see (21), showing that the technology levels
NE and NL are the same in the long-run equilibrium across regimes of technical
change. As a consequence expressions (17) and (22) in this case coincide and
there is no difference between the models with directed and undirected techni-
cal change. This is due to the fact that when s = 1, our CES speciﬁcation in (1)
reduces to a Cobb-Douglas production function, in which case technical change
will always be neutral to the inputs concerned. We summarize this discussion in
the following result:
Proposition 3. For s 6= 1 carbon leakage will be smaller with directed technical change
than with undirected technical change. For s = 1 it will be identical across regimes.
Proof. In text.Carbon leakage revisited 17
This result shows that the induced technology effect works against the stan-
dard terms-of-trade effect, and lowers the amount of carbon leakage that would
occur when entrepreneurs cannot target new inventions to labour or energy. Fig-
ure 1 shows the two effects. The pure terms-of-trade effect can be read from the
upwards shift of emissions from the dashed dark line (the model without a cap)
to the dark solid line (the model with a cap and undirected technical change).
The induced technology effect is summarized by the move from the solid black
line to the light gray one (the model with a cap and directed technical change).
As expected, the amount of emissions is lower when technical change is directed,
with the exception of the case of Cobb-Douglas technology.
Now one ﬁnal question needs to be addressed: can the induced technology
effect more than off-set the terms-of-trade effect and lead to a situation where
carbon leakage is negative? Figure 1 shows that an afﬁrmative answer is in order.
Indeed, the curve representing emissions under directed technical change (the
light one) dips below the graph of the baseline case (the dashed curve), as s gets
larger. The following proposition makes it formal:14
Proposition 4. When technical change is directed, carbon leakage due to a marginal
tightening of the emission constraint will be positive for s < 2, zero for s = 2, and
negative for s > 2.
Proof. In section A.3 of the Appendix we use the log-linearized model to show














(2¡ s)(hf + n) + 1¡ f
. (26)
As discussed in the Appendix, a necessary condition for a stable equilibrium is
that the term at the denominator is positive. Moreover, the second term in paren-
thesis at the numerator is always positive. Hence, around a stable equilibrium,
we have f Lu
E/f Lc
E R 0 whenever s R 2.
When technical change is directed, the induced technology effect can thus
outweigh the terms-of-trade effect, provided that the relative demand for energy
is sufﬁciently elastic. The introduction of an emission cap in one country in-
creases the relative demand for YE in the other. To serve the increased demand,
producers in the unconstrained country can only expand energy generation and
hence emissions when technology ratio N is given. When relative technology
is free to change however, as is the case when technical change is directed, it
will adjust to the new relative factor supply and reduce the amount of energy
necessary to satisfy the demand for the energy-intensive good.
14Although this proposition represents a local result, all our simulations conﬁrm this pattern
for the model in levels.Carbon leakage revisited 18
The results in proposition 4 are driven by two mechanisms. To analyze these
mechanisms we ﬁrst show how the composition of technology is affected by the
introductionofthecap. Successivelyweaddresstheinteractionbetweenchanges
in N, the level of s, and relative factor productivity, to understand the labour
allocation decision in the unconstrained country.
The composition of technology evolves according to the relative proﬁtability
of R&D in the different sectors, thus N will increase whenever relative proﬁts p
rise. As noted in section 3.2, the ﬁnal effect of introducing a cap (i.e. a change
in Sw) on relative proﬁts will depend on both the change in the relative mar-
ket size and the change in relative prices. Climate policy reduces the amount of
energy produced and hence decreases the potential size of the market for new
energy-complementing innovations. At the same time, it makes energy more
scarce, thereby rising the price of energy and making an innovation for the en-
ergy intensive good more valuable. Whether the negative market size effect or
the positive price effect dominates depends on s, the elasticity of the relative
demand for energy with respect to its relative price. Since in the long-run equi-
librium the technology ratio is given by (21), we see that whenever s < 1 the
price effect dominates and the introduction of a cap will induce an increase in
N. When s > 1 on the other hand, the market size effect dominates and N de-
creases. This yields a relation between N and s such as the one plotted in Figure
3, where the gray line represents the ratio of technology under directed technical
change and the dark one depicts the case of undirected technical change.
These differences in technology composition across versions of the model de-
termine the differences in the relative productivity of energy and labour, that
ultimately drive the results of this section. Recalling from (16) that relative factor
productivity for the constrained model can be written as,
w = N(s¡1)/s(Sw)¡1/s,
we clearly see that, for given N, the effect of the cap is to unambiguously in-
crease the relative productivity of energy since it initially becomes scarcer on the
global market, and thus to increase pollution in the unconstrained country. Con-
sequently, leakage is always positive when the technology ratio is given. Once
we allow N to change in response to economic incentives, some form of induced
energy saving technical change occurs. The expression above shows how the ef-
fect of a change in the technology ratio on relative factor productivity depends
on s. Indeed, when s < 1, N is higher than in the case of undirected technical
change (see Figure 3). In this case N(s¡1)/s is lower, and the increase in relative
productivity induced by the cap is counteracted by the change in technology.
The same result can be obtained for s > 1, in which case both N and N(s¡1)/s
are below their baseline levels. As a result the induced change in technology
(N(s¡1)/s) mitigates the terms-of-trade effect (which works through (Sw)
¡1/s).
To determine which of the two effects will be stronger, we substitute (21) inCarbon leakage revisited 19
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Figure 3: Technology ratios (N) under undirected and directed technical change
(16) to obtain the general equilibrium relative factor productivity:
w = (Sw)s¡2.
Evidently, as long as s < 2 the decrease in the factor ratio induced by the cap will
lead to an increase in the relative productivity of energy and leakage will be pos-
itive (but lower than under undirected technical change). When s > 2 instead,
the decrease in Sw will reduce the relative productivity of energy. The change
in the technology ratio is so strong that it will more than compensate for the
terms-of-trade effect, and the unconstrained country will voluntarily decrease
its emissions.
5 Conclusions
The refusal of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is seen by many as a
serious threat to the Protocol’s effectiveness. Most economists would indeed ar-
gue that if a coalition of technologically advanced (and hence fossil-fuel depen-
dent) economies decides to voluntarily reduce its emissions of carbondioxide,
this will increase the price of dirty goods within this coalition while the world
price of fossil fuels may fall due to the lower demand from the coalition. HenceCarbon leakage revisited 20
unconstrained countries, such as the US, can produce dirty goods at a lower cost
and export them to coalition members, thereby offsetting the decrease in emis-
sions from the coalition (carbon leakage).
While the literature on carbon leakage has largely overlooked the role of tech-
nical change, we believe that including the endogenous development of technol-
ogy into the analysis is key to understanding the long-run reactions to unilateral
climate policy. In this paper we have studied the problem of carbon leakage
when a technologically advanced country is outside the coalition focussed on
the effects of directed technical change. Allowing technology levels in the clean
and dirty goods sector to develop differently, we have compared the results with
those derived from a model of ‘traditional’ endogenous technical change. From
an environmental point of view we have obtained comforting results: directed
technical change always lowers the incentive to pollute for the unconstrained
country. Indeed, with directed technical change, unilateral climate policy may
even induce the unconstrained region to reduce its emissions, when the relative
demand for energy is elastic enough. Moreover we have shown that unilateral
climate policy will always be effective to some degree, as the leakage rate will
always be less than 100%.
In the light of these results some of the concerns voiced by critics of the Kyoto
Protocol may be unjustiﬁed. Ratifying countries, in particular, should be relieved
by our conclusions: their efforts to reduce polluting emissions will be undone by
the reactions of others to a lesser extent than often suggested. Moreover, when-
ever the demand for polluting goods is elastic enough, the ratiﬁers’ efforts will
even be reinforced by the emissions reduction undertaken by the unconstrained
countries and global emissions will decrease.
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A Appendix: the log-linearized model
In this appendix we (log-)linearize the model around the steady state and derive
several results.
A.1 Deriving the log-linearized model
The linearized version of the goods market equilibrium condition (17) reads:
(s ¡ 1) e N = [(1¡ f)s + hf + n] f Lu
E +
·








where a tilde,e, over a variable denotes a small percentage change, and where



















The percentage changes in Lu
E and Lc
E denote any marginal change in the respec-
tive variable. For example, a decrease in Lc
E (that is a f Lc
E < 0) from Lc
E = LE
would represent the introduction of a marginal emissions cap in the country,
while a decrease from any Lc
E < LE would represent any marginal tightening of
an existing cap.
When we linearize the equilibrium condition for the market for innovations,
(21), we ﬁnd:
e N = (s ¡ 1)
µ







E + (s ¡ 1)(hf + n) f Lu
E. (A.3)
A.2 Appendix to Proposition 2





ing logs and differentiating yields the following representation in growth rates:
f Ew = hff Lu
E + (1¡ h)ff Lc
E < 0, where we have used the deﬁnition of h from
(A.2).
From (A.1), setting e N = 0 due to the undirectedness of technical change, we
can solve for Lu
E. Using this to substitute in the expression for the change in total











(1¡ f)s + hf + n
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A.3 Appendix to Proposition 4














(2¡ s)(hf + n) + 1¡ f
. (A.5)
The denominator of this expression will be positive around any stable equilib-
rium. Indeed, the dynamics of the system require that the slope of the goods
market equilibrium condition be steeper than the R&D equilibrium condition in























= (s ¡ 1)(hf + n),
where the subscripts GME and R&DE indicate the goods markets and the R&D
market equilibrium conditions, respectively. Since the condition above simpliﬁes
to
(2¡ s)(hf + n) + 1¡ f > 0,
we have established our claim.